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The different forms of religious unbelief are still much of an open question. Using data 
(N=4404) from three European countries, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands, we sought 
to identify underlying unbeliever groups among those with the strongest disbelief in God 
(N=2258). Latent class analyses were conducted on the non-theistic supernatural beliefs of 
this subsection of participants, resulting in the same three unbeliever groups in each country: 
analytic atheists, spiritual but not religious (SBNR) and uncertain nonbelievers. Next, we 
explored these groups on a variety of dimensions, especially on the group members' attitudes 
to religion, certainty of beliefs, cognitive dispositions, and world view. One-way ANOVAs 
revealed similarities as well as distinct characters for each of the latent groups. The groups 
differed most in intuitive thinking style, over-mentalizing bias and other ontological 
confusions. To compare the latent groups to all other individuals who took part in the study, 
two discriminant analyses were run with all participants. This resulted in four meaningful 
dimensions that supported and extended the ANOVAs findings and allowed for the 
consideration of other (non)believers. Overall, this study supports earlier findings on analytic 
atheists and SBNR while also providing new information about their dispositions. 
Interestingly, the uncertain nonbeliever group has been largely unexplored previously and it 
should gain more attention in future studies.  
 
Key words: Atheism; Nonbelievers; Spiritual but not religious; Cognitive dispositions; 
Attitudes towards religion  
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Religious Unbelief in Three Western European Countries: Identifying and 
Characterizing Unbeliever Types Using Latent Class Analysis 
Empty churches and an increasing number of people with no religious affiliation have 
made religious unbelief a major and lively topic in the study of religion. Unbelief is a 
complicated subject, illustrated in the diverse and fuzzy labeling of unbelievers (e.g. atheists, 
agnostics, irreligious, secular, nonreligious and nonbelievers), often with overlapping 
connotations. Moreover, the absence of religious beliefs most probably takes distinct forms in 
different cultures and individuals, but empirical studies are still few and the forms of unbelief 
are poorly understood. Given that unaffiliated or ‘nones’ is the second largest group among 
Western Europeans, right after Christians (Pew Research Center, 2018), understanding the 
varieties of religious unbelief is highly important.  
In this study, we use the terms unbelief and unbelievers as umbrella terms for those who 
lack belief in a God. A key question to start with in the study of unbelief is what kind of 
unbelievers are there? Some researchers have begun to examine this question, and the results 
show that unbelievers can differ in their personality types (Baker & Robbins, 2012), 
philosophical orientations (Schnell, 2015), their sources of finding meaning in life (Schnell & 
Keenan, 2011), and the ways in which they understand religious unbelief and identities 
(Silver, Coleman, Hood, & Holcombe, 2014). Social background and cognitive profile have 
also been theorized to account for distinct forms of atheism, such as analytic atheism, i.e., 
unbelief due to strong analytic thinking, and incredulous atheism, i.e., unbelief due to a lack 
of relevant religious input (e.g., Kalkman, 2014; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013). Reflecting the 
early stages of research in this area, these descriptions are based on isolated studies, which 
makes them difficult to integrate theoretically.  
In the present study, we aim to form a clearer and broader understanding of religious 
unbelief. We examine unbelievers across three countries, Denmark, Finland, and the 
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Netherlands. In these countries, only 17% - 24% believe in God as described in the Bible, 
while 24% - 34% of people do not believe in any higher power (Pew Research Center, 2018), 
which makes them ideal testbeds for exploring the different forms that unbelief could take. 
The purpose of the study is twofold. We will first identify different groups of individuals who 
report a lack of belief in God. Next, we will comprehensively portray these unbeliever groups 
with various psychological characteristics. Because of the broad topic and scarcity of previous 
research, the study is highly exploratory.  
Identification of Distinct Unbeliever Types  
One of the main challenges in profiling different unbelievers in empirical studies 
concerns the basic criteria for distinguishing religious unbelievers from each other. So far, 
scholars have divided unbelievers into subgroups based on, for example, participants' 
religious affiliations (Willard & Norenzayan, 2017), affiliation and God beliefs (Baker & 
Smith, 2009), and self-reported religious identities (Silver et al., 2014). In this study, 
however, we identify unbeliever types based on their supernatural beliefs and lack thereof. 
It is important to identify unbelievers in terms of their supernatural beliefs because 
belief in supernatural phenomena is a key characteristic of all religions, and labels such as 
theist, atheist, agnostic, and nonbeliever, as well as most theories about religiosity (e.g., as 
within the cognitive science of religion and evolutionary accounts of religion), are based 
around the common theme of supernatural beliefs. Yet, considerations of supernatural have 
usually been implicit and indirect, and empirical studies on religious unbelievers’ supernatural 
beliefs are scarce (for specifying the concept ‘supernatural’, see Lindeman & Svedholm, 
2012). In other words, if one has no supernatural beliefs at all, one cannot be religious. 
However, not all supernatural beliefs are religious, and consequently, one can be a religious 
unbeliever and still have supernatural beliefs. We use the term supernatural beliefs here to 
refer to 1) religious supernatural beliefs (in this study, belief in God), 2) such supernatural 
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beliefs which are often but not necessarily linked with God beliefs (e.g., afterlife), and 3) 
supernatural beliefs which are not typically religious (e.g., telepathy).  
Although systematic studies on unbelievers' supernatural beliefs are still missing, 
research on spiritual but not religious individuals (Saucier & Skrzypińska, 2006; Willard & 
Norenzayan, 2017) and New Age believers (Bainbridge, 2004; Farias, Claridge, & Lalljee, 
2005) clearly shows that religious disbelief does not necessarily imply disbelief in other 
supernatural phenomena such as telepathy or astrology. Analyzing unbelievers' supernatural 
beliefs allows us to examine how absolute unbelievers (who reject every supernatural belief) 
and more selective unbelievers (who reject only some supernatural beliefs) are represented in 
our data.  
In order to identify varieties of unbelief, we use latent class analysis (LCA,  Muthén & 
Muthén, 2000) to classify unbelievers, rather than using a priori categories such as religious 
non-affiliation or self-reported religious identification. LCA is a statistical modeling 
technique which reveals hidden categories by grouping individuals so that individuals in one 
category are like each other and different from individuals in other categories.   
Characterization of Unbeliever Types 
The other aim of this study is to characterize the unbeliever groups identified by LCA.  
Most scholars in the field of religion agree that we know far too little about what different 
unbelievers are like (Lee, 2014; Quack, 2014; Silver et al., 2014). To advance theoretical 
knowledge and empirical clarity, we will utilize research on attitudes because attitude 
research has a long history in analyzing people’s states of mind towards socially significant 
affairs, as well as their determinants and consequences. In this study, we portray the 
unbeliever groups identified by LCA by their attitudes towards religion, and by their cognitive 
characteristics, world views, religious identity, family background and affiliations. Figure 1 
shows the various constructs we included in the study.  
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INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Attitudes toward religion. Attitudes have two major dimensions, valence (positive – 
negative evaluation) and strength.  Attitude strength has several subdimensions and they can 
weaken or enhance an attitude’s impact (Sawicki & Wegener, 2018). We address the 
following strength dimensions because they have proven to be the most important and 
consequential in shaping thinking, belief persistence, and behavior (Barden & Tormala, 2014; 
Howe & Krosnick, 2017): extremity (extreme vs. neutral evaluation of religiousness), 
intensity (how much religions and people's religiosity activates emotions), ambivalence (the 
degree to which a person holds positive and negative evaluations of religiosity 
simultaneously), elaboration (the degree of thought one has given to the merits and 
shortcomings of one's attitudes toward religion), interest (how much one finds religious issues 
and religiosity stimulating and thought-provoking), correctness (how certain one is that one's 
attitudes toward religion are the correct way of thinking), and importance (how much one 
attaches significance to one's attitudes toward religion). In addition to these attitudes toward 
religion, we also assess respondents’ attitudes about the importance of religion and science, as 
well as respondents’ perceived level of conflict between religion and science.  
Although unbelievers' attitudes have not been systematically examined, attitude-related 
terms are often used in the description of various unbelievers. For example Norenzayan and 
Gervais (2013) describe 'apatheism' as indifference to religious agents and practices, found for 
example in cultures that are characterized by existential security. In attitude terms, they 
describe how social background brings forth neutral evaluation, weak interest and low 
importance of religion (cf., Figure 1).  Similarly, forms of atheism such as aggressive and 
assertive anti-theism (Silver et al., 2014) can be conceptualized to differ on the dimensions of 
attitude evaluation and strength, and to have effects on behavior.  
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Cognition. One important cognitive characteristic of at least some unbelievers is 
expected to be analytic thinking and its associates: Ample evidence shows that religious 
beliefs decrease with analytic thinking style and cognitive reflection (Gervais & Norenzayan, 
2012; Pennycook, 2014),  that religious beliefs increase with intuitive thinking (Shenhav, 
Rand, & Greene, 2012), and that religious beliefs are related to cognitive biases such as 
dualism, over-mentalizing, and other ontological confusions (Banerjee & Bloom, 2014; 
Demertzi et al., 2009; Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, & Lipsanen, 2015; Pennycook, 
Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013). In line with these 
findings, Norenzayan and Gervais (2013) describe one form of religious disbelief, 'analytic 
atheism', as arising from analytic cognitive strategies that overrule the intuitive biases that 
support religious belief (see also Kalkman, 2014, for a similar characterization of 'reflective 
atheists')  While analytic atheists are proposed to inhibit the intuitive biases that support 
religious beliefs, a different group of nonbelievers, called 'mind-blind atheists' (Norenzayan & 
Gervais, 2013) is suggested to have intuitive difficulties in understanding religious agents; 
arising from deficits in social cognition, associated usually with autistic traits. Although the 
evidence for the relationship between nonreligiosity and autistic traits is so far weak or even 
absent (Maij et al., 2017; Reddish, Tok, & Kundt, 2016; Schaap-Jonker, Sizoo, van 
Schothorst-van Roekel, & Corveleyn, 2013), we will examine how social cognitive 
impairment, and cognitive styles and biases, relate to various unbeliever types. 
Unbelievers may also differ in their views on the nature of knowledge and on the 
accepted justifications for knowing and believing, that is, in their epistemic stance. Consider 
for example the concepts of agnosticism, an "ideology entailing the belief that nothing is 
known or can be known of" versus atheism, "a belief in the non-existence of a God or gods" 
(Bullivant & Lee, 2016). Because systematic studies on epistemic beliefs in individuals with 
differing views of religious tenets are missing, we examine unbelievers' epistemological 
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views about knowledge and about arguments. Views on the nature of knowledge can vary on 
the continuum from simple to complex (Schommer-Aikins, 2004). Views of arguments can 
vary from beliefs that assertions are either correct or incorrect to beliefs that assertions are 
judgments that can be evaluated according to criteria of argument and evidence (Kuhn, 
Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000).  
World view. Because both nonreligious individuals (Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 
2004) and spiritual but not religious individuals (Saroglou & Munoz‐García, 2008; Saucier 
& Skrzypińska, 2006) value traditions less than religious individuals, we explore whether 
non-traditionalism is typical for all or for only some types of unbelievers. We also examine 
beliefs related to free will and determinism, and people’s perception of the mind as a bounded 
vs. a porous entity (van Elk, 2018). Religious believers tend to differ in their free will beliefs, 
with some believing that everything that happens in the world is ordained by God, while 
others believe humans are inherently free to choose (van Elk, Rutjens, & van Harreveld, 
2017). Relatedly, a key characteristic of religious and spiritual beliefs is to view the human 
mind as a porous entity, through which communication with the divine is possible (e.g., 
through prayer or worship).  
Affiliation, identification, and social background. Some unbeliever characteristics 
will be explored in less detail. First, because the terms such as agnostic, atheist, and 
nonreligious can be understood in several ways (Lee, 2014), we examine which self-
identifications and affiliations are typical in the different unbeliever groups. We will also 
examine whether the unbeliever groups differ in terms of parents' religiosity. The role of 
parents and other social models in adopting or discarding supernatural beliefs has recently 
been emphasized in theories of “credibility-enhancing displays” (e.g., Lanman & Buhrmester, 
2017). Correspondingly, one type of atheism, 'InCREDulous atheism', has been specified as 
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indifference towards religiosity deriving from absence of exposure to credible displays of 
faith in God or gods (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013).  
The Present Study  
In sum, the study has two aims. The first purpose is to identify latent unbeliever groups 
based on respondents' supernatural beliefs. Second, these unbeliever groups will be described 
in terms of attitudes towards religiosity and religion, cognitive styles and biases, epistemic 
stance, world view, parents' religiosity, religious identification and religious affiliation.  
Method 
Participants 
The participants were 4404 individuals from Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands 
(48.2% female, 49.4% male, 1.2% other). Their ages varied between 18 and 84 (M = 39.7, SD 
= 14.2), and full-time occupation was studying (17.3%), working (60.4%), or other (20.7%). 
The participants’ educational background was as follows: compulsory school (2.7%), some 
high school (7.4%), completed high school or equivalent (23.0%), some university/college 
(23.8%), completed university/college (36.1%), some postgraduate work (2.6%), and 
completed a postgraduate degree (3.2%).  Missing answers explain why the accumulative 
percentage is less than 100%.  
Religious affiliations were none (68.1%), Lutheranism (20.7%), Catholicism (3.2%), 
Orthodox (0.5%), Islam (0.7%), Hinduism (0.2%), Buddhism (0.4%), Judaism (0.2%), or 
other (3.9%). The participants chose their religious identity based from given alternatives as 
follows: atheist (29.5%), unbeliever (10.2), agnostic (explained by the phrase "I believe that 
the existence of God cannot be proven or disproven", 11.8%), nonbeliever (17.9%), secular 
(3.7%), religious believer (8.7%), spiritual but not religious (8.2%), spiritual seeker (5.1%), 
and other (4.9%).  
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Subjective socioeconomic status (SES) was assessed with a 10-point scale (Adler, Epel, 
Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000). The participants were instructed to regard their life in terms 
of a ladder, where people with the most money, the highest level of education and the most 
appreciated jobs are at the top (score = 10), and people with the least money and education 
and the least valued jobs are at the bottom (score = 1). The participants were asked where they 
would place themselves on the ladder compared to other Finnish (Danish, Dutch) people. The 
most common levels were 7 (26.1%) and 8 (20.0%). The other responses were divided as 
follows: Level 1 = 0.7%, 2 = 2.3%, 3 = 6.0%, 4 = 8.0%, 5 = 12.3%, 6 = 17.1%, 9 = 5.4%, and 
10 = 1.1%. 
The main analyses were conducted with participants who strongly disagreed with the 
statement ‘I believe in God’ (see below). They were 2258 individuals (mean age = 39.3, range 
18 - 80 years), 40% were female, and their full-time occupation was studying (15.8%), 
working (65.1%), or other (19.1%). Their education, SES, and religious affiliations and 
identifications are described in the results section. 
Procedure 
The study was conducted online in Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands, and in all 
three countries the data was collected in ca. 3 weeks. The participants were told that the study 
investigates how people think about religious beliefs, unbelief, science and knowledge. A 
hyperlink to the questionnaire was included in the message.   
 In Finland (N=2268) and Denmark (N=1208) the participants were recruited to the 
online study via several Facebook group pages (e.g., the Finnish Association of Skeptics, the 
Danish Atheist Society, the Danish Humanist Society). In addition, two twitter accounts, 
several university and open university student mailing lists, and a pool of participants who 
had expressed interest in taking part in our studies, were used in Finland. In the Netherlands 
(N=928) two different samples were taken: one group of participants (N = 293) consisted of 
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Dutch first-year psychology students and the other group of participants (N = 635) was 
recruited via an online research agency with access to a representative panel (N ~ 100.000) of 
Dutch participants.  
No compensation was offered to the Danish participants. In Finland all participants 
were promised feedback about their view of the world profile, which was based on the 
participants' responses on some of the scales included in the survey (i.e., values and 
supernatural beliefs, thinking styles, and views about religiosity, knowledge and science). In 
the Netherlands psychology students participated in exchange for course credits and the other 
group of respondents participated in exchange for a small financial remuneration.  
Materials 
For every scale in the study: If a participant had 25% or more missing items on a scale, 
the sum variable for that scale was not calculated for that participant. Some sum variables had 
a skewness or kurtosis > |1|. Because using the log10-transformation of these variables did not 
change the results, all analyses were conducted with the original variables.   
Supernatural beliefs and certainty. The participants were asked to rate their 
agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) with the following nine statements: “I 
believe in God”, “I believe in life after death”, “The universe originated from intelligent 
design”, “The universe has an ultimate purpose”, “I believe in fate”, “There is spiritual energy 
in the universe”, “In the universe, everything is connected in a way that cannot be explained 
scientifically”, “Telepathic mind reading is possible”, and “I believe in angels”. These beliefs 
were selected to represent currently held supernatural beliefs, including both religious beliefs 
as well as other supernatural beliefs recently observed among non-religious people 
(Bainbridge, 2004; Ecklund, Park, & Sorrell, 2011; Flere & Kirbiš, 2009; Garfield, Drwecki, 
Moore, Kortenkamp, & Gracz, 2014; Järnefelt, Canfield, & Kelemen, 2015; Schofield, Baker, 
Staples, & Sheffield, 2016). Participants’ responses to these statements were used to conduct 
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the LCA to identify the different groups of unbelievers according to their different 
supernatural beliefs (see Results).  
 After each belief question, the question “How certain are you about your response”, 
with the options “uncertain” (1), “somewhat uncertain” (2), and “certain” (score 3), was 
presented, resulting in nine certainty responses, respectively. (Because we also measured 
response times to be examined in another study, the belief and certainty question for spiritual 
healing were presented first as practice items.)  
Attitudes towards religion. Attitudes toward religion were originally assessed with 
seven 3-item subscales. The scales of evaluation, extremity ambivalence, interest, importance, 
and elaboration had good reliabilities (α's = .70 - .89). Because the reliabilities of intensity 
and correctness subscales were low (α's < .50), and because one elaboration item lowered the 
subscale’s reliability, we used the following statements as single-item measures: "How strong 
are the positive emotions that religions provoke in you?” (positive emotions) and "How strong 
negative emotions do religions provoke in you?” (negative emotions) from the intensity 
subscale; and "How certain are you that your attitudes toward religion reflect the right way to 
think about religious issues?” (correctness), "Could you consider changing your attitudes 
toward religion?” (considering change), and "Do you think other people should have similar 
attitudes toward religion as you?" (other people) from the correctness subscale. All questions 
were answered with a 5-point scale with appropriate response alternatives, such as 1 = no, 5 = 
very much; 1 = very difficult, 5 = very easy; 1 = never, 5 = very often. For a more detailed 
description of the attitude scales, see Supplementary material.  
Besides addressing the subjective importance of one's own attitudes toward religion 
(described above), participants' views about the importance of religion and science were 
assessed. We used the "Importance of science" subscale from a questionnaire measuring 
attitudes towards science and technology (Kind, Jones, & Barmby, 2007). We modified the 
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statements so that both perceived importance of science (α = .96) and importance of religion 
(α = .87) could be assessed with similar statements (e.g., “The benefits of religion [‘science’ 
in the other scale] are greater than its harmful effects”). The participants indicated their level 
of agreement to the items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).  
Finally, participants' views on the conflict between religion and science were assessed 
by presenting the statement "Religion and science are not in conflict with each other" with 
three answer options (1 = agree, 2 = moderately agree, 3 = disagree).  
Cognition.  
Analytic and intuitive thinking.  To assess cognitive reflection, we used the new 
version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005), CRT-2 (Thomson & 
Oppenheimer, 2016). CRT-2 includes four items, such as “If you’re running a race and you 
pass the person in second place, what place are you in?”. The number of correct responses 
was used as an index of cognitive reflection. 
In addition, need for cognition (a.k.a. analytic thinking style) and intuitive thinking 
styles were assessed with a 6-item Need for Cognition scale (α = .72) and with a 5-item Faith 
in Intuition scale (α = .74). The items were derived from the 10-item Faith in Intuition scale 
(FI) and from the 12-item Need for Cognition scale in the Rational/Experiential Multimodal 
Inventory (REIm, Norris & Epstein, 2011). Example items are "I enjoy problems that require 
hard thinking" and "I like to rely on my intuitive impressions" (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = 
strongly agree). The criteria for item selection is described in the Supplementary material.  
Social cognitive impairment. Deficits in social cognitive skills were assessed with the 
Social skills dimension from the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ-short; Hoekstra et al., 2011).  
The scale (α = .77) includes 7 four-point items (1 = strongly agree; 4 = strongly disagree), for 
example “I find social situations easy” (reversed).  
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Core knowledge confusions. We used 14 statements from the Core Knowledge 
Confusions scale (α = .82, Lindeman et al., 2015). Example statements are "Force lives in the 
universe" and "House knows its history". The participants were asked to rate on a 5-point 
scale whether the statements were fully metaphorical (1) or fully literal (5). They were given 
an example of literally true ("Mozart was a composer") and only metaphorically true 
(‘‘Friends are the salt of life’’) statements before rating the items. The scale also included six 
filler items, three metaphorical (e.g., "Howling wind is a flute") and three literal ("Flowing 
water is liquid").  
Over-mentalizing. Over-mentalizing was assessed by asking participants to evaluate 23 
words on the basis of characterizing them as mental or non-mental (α = .92; 1 = Not at all 
mental, 4 = Mental). The instruction also specified that "By mental we mean anything that has 
some kind of psyche or spirit, or something which has mental properties. For example, 
thoughts are mental and human beings are mental beings. Many people also consider God to 
be a mental being. A pen or a car, by contrast, is generally considered non-mental". The 
stimulus words were physical processes, lifeless matter, artificial objects, or living but 
inanimate phenomena (e.g., electricity, water, paper and moss).  The fillers, included to 
obscure the meaning of the scale, were abstractions, animates or mental phenomena (e.g., 
justice, fish, goal). For details of the scale, see Lindeman & Svedholm-Häkkinen (2016).  
Dualism. We measured to what extent participants endorsed a dualistic or a monistic 
conception of the human mind and body by using a variant of the inclusion-of-other-in-the-
self scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). Participants were presented with 7 (Denmark and 
the Netherlands or 5 (Finland) pairs of circles with the words ‘body’ and ‘soul’. The circles 
differed in their degree of overlap from almost completely overlapping to being completely 
isolated. They were instructed to select the picture that ‘according to you best represents the 
relation between the body and the mind’, resulting in a score between 1 (= strong dualist 
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conception) and 7 or 5 (= strong monist conception). We rescored the scales from the Dutch 
and Danish data, to allow for a direct comparison between countries.  
Epistemic stance. Views of arguments were assessed by the modified Epistemic 
Understanding Questionnaire (EUQ, Kuhn et al., 2000). Our version of the EUQ (α = .80,  
Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2017) included ten pairs of contrasting claims, attributed to two 
individuals, originally named Robin and Chris (the names were replaced with Finnish, Danish 
and Dutch names). An example item is: “Robin thinks people should take responsibility for 
themselves. Chris thinks people should work together to take care of each other”. The 
participants were told that “both can have some rightness” and then asked, "can one have a 
better or more correct view than the other?" The response options were “One could not be 
more right than the other” (reflecting a lower level of epistemological understanding, scored 
as 1) and “One could be more right” (reflecting a higher level, scored as 2).  
Views of knowledge questionnaire included eight items (α = .70), modified after the 
items in the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002) and the 
Epistemological Questionnaire (Schommer, 1990). An example items is: "Things are simpler 
than most experts would have you believe". The participants were asked if they agreed with 
the items (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).  
World view. 
Values. The five values that have been shown to differentiate religious people from 
unbelievers (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) were assessed by selecting the corresponding value 
items from the Short Schwartz’s Value Survey (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005). The 
participants were asked to rate the importance of the following values as a life-guiding 
principle for them on an 8-point scale (0 = Opposed to my principles, 8 = Supreme 
importance): hedonism (e.g. gratification of desires, enjoyment in life, self-indulgence), 
stimulation (e.g. daring, a varied and challenging life, an exciting life), self-direction (e.g. 
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creativity, freedom, curiosity, independence, choosing one's own goals), tradition (e.g. respect 
for tradition, humbleness, accepting one's portion in life, devotion, modesty), and conformity 
(e.g. obedience, honoring parents and elders, self-discipline, politeness).  
Free will and scientific determinism. The Free will (α = .83) and Scientific 
determinism (α = .72) subscales from the FAD-Plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011) were used. Both 
scales consist of 7 statements answered on a 5-point scale (1=strongly disagree, 5= strongly 
agree). Example items are “People can overcome any obstacles if they truly want to” (Free 
will) and “Your genes determine your future” (Determinism). 
Porous mind. The Porous theory of mind scale (van Elk, 2018) consists of four 
metaphors representing the human mind as a bounded (e.g., ‘The human mind is like a box 
full of secrets and only you have the key to open it’) vs. a porous entity (e.g., ‘The human 
mind is like an internet router, transmitting and perceiving thoughts and feelings’). 
Participants indicated to what extent they thought the statement provided an accurate 
description of the human mind (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree; α = .71).  
Parents' religiosity. Parents' religiosity was assessed with two questions, one asking if 
the participant's mother is/was religious, the other asking about father's religiosity. The 
response options were: "No", "To some extent", "Yes", and "I don't know".  
Results 
Identification of the Unbeliever Types  
To identify different God unbeliever types, latent class analyses with one latent variable 
were run based on the seven supernatural beliefs. Only participants who strongly disagreed 
with the statement "I believe in God" (N = 2258) were included in the analyses. The analyses 
were conducted with Mplus, and the model fit was estimated by the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), a sample-size adjusted BIC (aBIC), 
and entropy. A good-fitting model has a small AIC, BIC, and aABIC (indicating 
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parsimonious models) and high entropy (indicating precision in assigning participants into 
appropriate classes). For comparing models with different numbers of classes, we used the 
Vuong–Lo–Mendell–Rubin likelihood ratio test. 
The fits from a 1-class model to a 7-class model were estimated (Table 1). The best-
fitting model was the three-class model: Three latent classes of unbelievers, with similar type 
of supernatural belief profiles, were observed in the three countries. The Vuong–Lo–
Mendell–Rubin likelihood ratio test indicated that adding a fourth class did not significantly 
improve the model.  
INSERT TABLE ABOUT 1 HERE 
Based on the characteristics and religious self-identifications of the latent group 
members (described below), we labeled the unbeliever groups as spiritual but not religious 
(SBNR, 3.7% of all unbelievers), analytic atheists (81.7%), and uncertain nonbelievers 
(14.6%). We also checked the relative proportion of the three latent groups in a subsample 
from the Netherlands because this subsample was representative of the entire Dutch 
population. Although the absolute sizes were somewhat different, the relative sizes of the 
groups were like those in the full data set: In the representative subsample, 12.6% of those 
who did not believe in God (score = 1) were in the SBNR group, 55% were analytic atheists, 
and 32.5% were uncertain nonbelievers. 
Figure 2 shows the means of the supernatural belief variables in the three unbeliever 
groups. Supernatural beliefs among religious believers (those who agreed or strongly agreed 
that they believe in God, N = 499) are included in Figure 2 only for comparison, they were 
not included in the LCA. The figure shows that analytic atheists had practically no 
supernatural beliefs. Uncertain nonbelievers, in turn, scored medium and the spiritual group 
scored high on most supernatural beliefs. For detailed information about the LCA results in 
the three countries, see Table S1 and the Supplementary Material.  
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Characterization of the Unbeliever Types 
Most of the comparisons were conducted with analyses of variance (ANOVA). Multiple 
ANOVAS are more appropriate than MANOVAs when the research being conducted is 
exploratory in nature, and when some or all of the outcome variables have previously been 
studied in univariate contexts (e.g., Huberty & Morris, 1989). To guard against the inflated 
probability of type 1 error, the analyses were conducted using both False discovery rate 
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) and Bonferroni correction.  
One-way ANOVAs were used to analyze the potential differences in the certainty of 
responses to the belief questions between the three unbeliever groups (Table 2). Correcting 
for type 1 error rate did not change the interpretation of the results so original unadjusted p-
values are presented in Table 2. Bonferroni correction was applied separately for the 
dependent variables presented in Table 2. The critical level of significance after Bonferroni 
correction was 0.0017. 
The main findings can be summarized as follows: Analytic atheists were more certain 
than the two other unbeliever groups of most of their (un)beliefs. Uncertain nonbelievers, in 
contrast, were more uncertain than the two other unbeliever groups of their belief in God, 
afterlife, spiritual energy and connected universe.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The characteristics of the members in the three groups were analyzed next. First, we 
looked at the affiliations, religious identifications and other background variables in the three 
unbeliever groups. Most of the group members had no religious affiliation (SBNR 75.3%, 
analytic atheists 92.3%, and uncertain nonbelievers 85.1%) or they were Lutheran (SBNR 
11.8%, analytic atheists 5.8%, uncertain nonbelievers 8.3%). Of the nine possible religious 
self-identification options, SBNR individuals selected most often the option ‘spiritual but not 
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religious’ (37.6%) or nonbeliever (23.7%). Analytic atheists chose ‘atheist’ (52.2%) or 
‘nonbeliever’ (18.9%), and uncertain nonbelievers chose ‘nonbeliever’ (29.3%) or atheist 
(25.9%).   
Analytic atheists were more often men (63.7%) than women; SBNR (75.3%) and 
uncertain nonbelievers were more often women (58.9%) than men, χ2 (4) = 133.52, p < .001. 
Compared to SBNR (M = 28 years) and uncertain nonbelievers (M = 24 years), analytic 
atheists were older (M = 32 years), F(1,2555) = 67.08, p < .001, more educated, χ2 (7) = 
58.70, p < .001, and they had higher SES, χ2(9) = 27.12, p = .001. The groups did not differ in 
mother’s or father’s religiosity, χ2(4) = 2.44, p = .66, and χ2 (4) = 3.48, p = .48.  
Next, gender differences in all attitudinal, cognitive, epistemic and world value 
variables were analysed. Although several (p < .001) significant differences were found, even 
the strongest effect size was small (ηp² = .06): women’s evaluations of religiosity were more 
positive (M = 2.72, SD = 0.96) than men’s evaluations (M = 2.22, SD = 0.97), F(1,4166) = 
273.39, p < .001. Because of the small effect sizes, gender was not included in the following 
analyses. 
To examine differences between the three latent groups further, one-way ANOVAs 
were conducted with attitudinal, cognitive, epistemic and world value variables as dependent 
variables (Table 3). Again, correcting for type 1 error rate did not change the interpretation of 
the results and original unadjusted p-values are presented in Table 3. Bonferroni correction 
was applied separately for the dependent variables. The critical level of significance after 
Bonferroni correction was 0.0017. The table shows that analytic atheists, spiritual but not 
religious, and uncertain nonbelievers did not differ in their interest in religious issues, views 
of arguments, willingness to consider changing their attitudes toward religion, perceived 
importance of science and religion, dualism, scientific determinism, or in hedonism, self-
direction and stimulation. The table also shows that the biggest differences between the 
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groups were the following: SBNR group scored highest and analytic atheists scored lowest on 
core knowledge confusions, over-mentalizing biases, and intuitive thinking style; analytic 
atheists scored highest and uncertain nonbelievers scored lowest on the perceived correctness 
of one’s attitudes toward religion, and analytic atheists hade a higher need for cognition than 
the others. Because of the large number of significant differences, we address the other 
differences in the Discussion. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Dimensions Differentiating All Participants 
The above results raised three interrelated questions. First, the analyses were conducted 
only with those who strongly disagreed with the statement ‘I believe in God’; How do these 
participants then differ from other unbelievers, namely those who only moderately disagreed 
with the statement? Second, since the characteristics of the SBNR group were similar to those 
of religious people (see Introduction), how do they differ from each other? And third, how do 
unbelievers’ attitudes toward religion and other characteristics compare to those of all other 
participants?  
To answer these questions, we conducted two discriminant function analyses with all 
participants, who were a priori grouped (see below). Discriminant analysis provides latent 
dimensions, called discriminant functions, which are linear combinations of the variables 
along which the groups differ (comparable to principal components). The analysis also 
provides the means of the groups on these dimensions (comparable to participants’ scores on 
the principal components).  
We grouped the participants based on the item “I believe in God”, which was assessed 
with a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Accordingly, seven groups 
were included in the analyses: SBNR, analytic atheists and uncertain nonbelievers (all of 
whom scored 1), and those who scored 2, 3 ,4, or 5.  
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The first analysis was conducted with variables assessing attitudes toward religion, and 
the second was conducted with cognitive, epistemic, and world view variables. Only variables 
where differences between the seven groups, analyzed with ANOVA, were at least of medium 
effect size (ηp² ≥ .06, ps < .05) were included.  
In the first analysis (Table 4), six significant functions (ps < .01) were found. However, 
the last four functions added less than 1 % to the explained variance and they revealed no 
important information about group differences. The first discriminant function, explaining 
76.5% of the variance, was named Positive but ambivalent attitudes toward religion, based on 
the variables that had highest loadings on the dimension (see Table 4).  The second function, 
named Extreme and determined attitudes toward religion, explained 21.4% of the variance.  
The second analysis (Table 4) revealed five significant functions (ps < .01) but only the 
first (explaining 88.9% of the variance) and the second (8.4%) included useful information 
about group differences. The first dimension was named Cognitive biases, intuition, and 
conservatism, and the second dimension was named Traditional values.  
The seven groups had different mean scores on all dimensions (the lower part of Table 
4). Because of space limits, we describe these results in the Discussion.  
INSERT TABLE ABOUT 4 HERE 
 
Discussion  
The purpose of this study was to portray different types of religious unbelievers. 
Specifically, we were interested in identifying God unbeliever types, based on their 
(un)beliefs in other supernatural phenomena, and to characterize these groups in terms of 
several cognitive, personality and social characteristics. Three similar unbeliever groups were 
found in each country, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands. Based on the characteristics 
and religious self-identifications of the group members, we labeled the groups as analytic 
atheists, spiritual but not religious individuals, and uncertain nonbelievers.  
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In some respects, the members of the three groups were like each other. Although the 
group members neither had very positive attitudes toward religion nor considered changing 
their attitudes, they were all moderately interested in religious issues. They also assessed the 
importance of science and religion in the same way, regarding science as more important than 
religion. In addition, no group differences were found for mother’s or father’s religiosity, for 
a deterministic world view, for views of arguments, or for the values of hedonism, stimulation 
and self-direction. Finally, although analytic atheists considered their attitudes toward religion 
more important than the others, these attitudes were not very important to any of the groups. 
Nevertheless, the differences between the groups were more apparent than the similarities, as 
discussed below.  
Analytic Atheists 
Analytic atheists were the largest unbeliever group. They were more often men than 
women, they had a somewhat higher level of education and self-reported socioeconomic 
status, and they were slightly older than the other unbelievers.  
Otherwise, this group was a textbook case of atheists: Compared with the other two 
unbeliever groups, they scored higher in cognitive reflection, they relied less on intuitions and 
more on an analytic thinking, and they exhibited least core knowledge confusions and over-
mentalizing biases. These are cognitive characteristics that have predicted religious unbelief 
in a host of earlier studies (e.g., Demertzi et al., 2009; Lindeman et al., 2015; Pennycook, 
2014; Shenhav et al., 2012; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013). The group also corresponds well 
with the outlines of an atheist type labeled as analytic atheists (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013) 
or reflective atheists (Kalkman, 2014). However, the present results extended this well-known 
image of a prototypical atheist in several ways.  
First, analytic atheists had practically no supernatural beliefs; they did not believe in 
angels or telepathy, for example. Compared to SBNR and uncertain nonbelievers, analytic 
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atheists were the most certain of their supernatural unbeliefs.  They saw more conflict 
between science and religion, valued conformity and traditions less, believed less in free will, 
and their epistemological beliefs were more developed since they regarded knowledge as 
more complex and uncertain. Furthermore, analytic atheists’ attitudes towards religiosity were 
more negative and extreme, more elaborated, less ambivalent, and emotionally more intense. 
They found it easier to explain their attitudes toward religion to other people, and they 
thought that their attitudes reflect the right way to think about religious issues.  
In addition, analytic atheists scored positively on the dimension describing extreme and 
determined attitudes toward religion. The analyses with all participants showed that only 
those who strongly agreed with the statement ‘I believe in God’ scored higher, and that no 
other participant groups endorsed extreme and determined attitudes toward religions. Based 
on what we know about strong attitudes (reviews: Barden & Tormala, 2014; Howe & 
Krosnick, 2017), it is possible that analytic atheists and strongly religious individuals are the 
groups whose  attitudes toward religion may boost emotional reactions and action, that are the 
most resistant to persuasion, and who will thus be the least likely to revise or change their 
beliefs during their lifetime. It is thus also possible that compared to other atheists, analytic 
atheists can be characterized as firm atheists 
Spiritual But not Religious Individuals 
 Spiritual but not religious individuals, the smallest of the three unbeliever groups, 
believed moderately or strongly in all other supernatural phenomena except God. These 
findings are in line with earlier studies showing that belief in supernatural phenomena explain 
most of the variance in self-reported spirituality (Lindeman, Blomqvist, & Takada, 2012; see 
also, Willard & Norenzayan, 2017). SBNR individuals were more often women than men and 
less educated than the other two groups. Their attitudes toward religion were moderate and 
weak: They had the less negative, less extreme and less determined attitudes toward religion 
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than analytic atheists or uncertain nonbelievers. They did not think that other people should 
have similar attitudes toward religion as they have, and they were least certain that their 
attitudes towards religiosity are correct. They also saw less conflict between religion and 
science than the two other unbeliever groups. Furthermore, spiritual but not religious 
participants endorsed stronger belief in free will, which could be related to a stronger 
endorsement of afterlife beliefs (e.g., obtaining rewards by performing good deeds). In line 
with previous studies (van Elk, 2018), they also viewed the human mind more as a porous 
entity than a bounded entity, which implies the possibility of direct communication with the 
supernatural (e.g., hearing voices of supernatural agents etc.). 
With respect to cognitive characteristics, SBNR individual were the opposite to analytic 
atheists: Compared to analytic atheists or uncertain nonbelievers, they relied on intuitive 
thinking in everyday life, they regarded the nature of knowledge as simple, they made more 
mistakes in the cognitive reflection test, and they exhibited more confusions of core 
knowledge and over-mentalizing biases. These results extend findings showing that such 
cognitive biases as dualism and anthropomorphism are typical for SBNR individuals (Willard 
& Norenzayan, 2017).  
As a whole, the dispositions describing SBNR in this study were the same dispositions 
that have described religious individuals in earlier studies (e.g., Demertzi et al., 2009; 
Lindeman et al., 2015; Pennycook, 2014; Shenhav et al., 2012; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013). 
The question is, then, what are the differences and similarities between these two groups? The 
discriminant analyses provided some answers. First, SBNR individuals had less positive, but 
also less extreme and less determined attitudes toward religion than strongly religious 
individuals. Second, both SBNR and religious individuals were equally high on the dimension 
consisting cognitive biases, intuitive thinking style, low need for cognition, porous mind, and 
traditional values. In contrast, SBNR were lowest and strongly religious individuals were 
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highest on the dimension which included only traditional values. These results confirm earlier 
findings that SBNR have more liberal values than religious individuals (Saroglou & Munoz‐
García, 2008; Saucier & Skrzypińska, 2006), and add to them by demonstrating that SBNR 
and religious people have a common cognitive profile. 
Uncertain nonbelievers 
The uncertain nonbeliever group was medium in size, average in supernatural beliefs, 
and they differed from analytic atheists and SBNR in that they had more doubts. Uncertain 
nonbelievers were the most hesitant group in their (un)beliefs in God, afterlife, spiritual 
energy, and the connected universe. Furthermore, like SBNR, they were more uncertain than 
analytic atheists of their (un)beliefs in intelligent design, purpose, fate, and telepathy. 
Uncertain nonbelievers’ indecision was also expressed in their attitudes: Together with 
SBNR, their attitudes toward religion were more ambivalent, more difficult to explain to other 
people, and less elaborated than analytic atheists’ attitudes. In cognitive profile, traditional 
values, free will and porous mind, uncertain nonbelievers were between the analytic atheists 
and SBNR. 
These results raised questions about the differences between uncertain nonbelievers and 
other religious disbelievers. Remember that like analytic atheists and SBNR, uncertain 
nonbelievers strongly disagreed with the item ‘I believe in God’.  If the nonbelievers were 
uncertain of their beliefs and attitudes, why did they not choose the options ‘disagree’ or ‘in 
between’, like other nonreligious individuals? Taking all results together, it seems that 
although nonbelievers’ key characteristic was their uncertainty about their religious and other 
supernatural beliefs, their attitudes toward religion and religiosity were nevertheless more 
negative and not as moderate and undetermined as those of other nonreligious individuals. 
This new and interesting class of unbelievers approximates uncertain and ambivalent 
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nonreligious identities observed by (Lee, 2015), and it should be studied in more detail in 
future. 
Limitations 
We used data from three countries, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands. Although 
these countries are not secular (they have state religions), religion is private and typically not 
pervasive in people’s everyday life, and being nonreligious is a socially accepted worldview 
(Zuckerman, 2012). Future studies should therefore replicate these findings in different 
countries, for example in the USA, where religion has much more power and where atheism 
is socially less acceptable. Future studies should also determine whether the same unbeliever 
groups can be identified across different populations if other supernatural belief items are 
used as classification criteria. In addition, addressing different characteristics (e.g., socio-
political attitudes, levels of societal activism, personality traits, or social environmental 
variables) might yield additional important information about various unbeliever types. 
The relative overrepresentation of analytical atheist may be related to our sampling 
strategy. We explicitly advertised the survey as a study on religious beliefs, and recruited 
among members of groups and organizations that were interested in religious beliefs. 
Unbelievers who are less interested in religion may either have lacked the motivation to 
respond to our survey, or be underrepresented in our sampling frame. This explanation, 
however, fails to explain why the Dutch representative sample showed a similar ratio between 
the three groups as in the other two countries 
A concern might be that the scales and items that we used might have been interpreted 
in different ways, especially in the three countries that were included in this study. Also, we 
did not test for cross-cultural equivalence of our survey. In addition, the effect sizes were 
relatively small, though the groups differed strongly on their explicit beliefs in supernatural 
phenomena. However, the overall pattern of results was consistent and robust across all 
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different measures and constructs that we used, and across all three countries that were 
included. Thus, although many differences between our groups were nuanced, they appeared 
still consistent and meaningful. 
Our purpose was to map the domain of religious unbelief as broadly as possible in one 
study, and therefore only approximate assessments could be used. More sophisticated 
methods should be used in future, especially for epistemic cognition and social cognitive 
impairment which were here assessed only shortly.  
Although the data obtained by on-line surveys have been shown to be of at least as good 
quality as data obtained by traditional methods (e.g., Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 
2004), a common method bias may challenge the results. Moreover, we labeled the unbeliever 
groups ourselves, and it is likely that the labels analytic atheists, SBNR and uncertain 
nonbelievers do not reflect all group member’s self-identifications. To address these 
challenges, we shall proceed with analyzing the present data based on the participants’ 
religious self-identifications and by analyzing their implicit supernatural beliefs.  
Finally, one limitation of the present study is the a-theoretical approach, reflecting a 
pronounced lack of coherent theory of unbelief.  Besides its fundamental function of 
description, a good scientific theory should parsimoniously explain why the constructs are 
related, it should place limits on what is useful to look at, it should integrate the diverse 
findings in the field, and generate further hypotheses (Gelso, 2006). At the same time, 
following the empirical cycle, theory formation goes hand in hand with exploratory data 
analyses, which in turn can lead to the formulation of more precise hypotheses for a 
confirmatory approach (Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012).  
As such we hope that our multifaceted description of religious unbelievers adds to the 
literature by laying the ground for theory formation of religious unbelief.  
Implications  
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The results have several implications for future research on religious unbeliefs. First, of 
the three unbeliever types we identified, analytic atheists and spiritual but not religious 
individuals are well-known, but the uncertain nonbeliever group is less-known. As (Lee, 
2014) has noted, generic nonreligious identifications are important indicators of the advance 
of nonreligious cultures and yet remain a somewhat vague category. Thus, the prevalence and 
characteristics of nonbelievers who are uncertain of their religious beliefs should be examined 
further in future studies. 
Analytic atheists formed a large majority of the unbelievers. Similar observations have 
also been reported earlier. In Silver et al.'s (2014) study, the largest group was “academics”, 
in Wilson, Bulbulia, and Sibley's (2014) study, it was “undifferentiated skeptics”, and in 
Aarnio and Lindeman's (2007) study, the largest group was “skeptics”, which are all close to 
the present analytic atheist group based on their characteristics. The present SBNR group, in 
turn, was very small, not only in the whole sample but also in the representative subsample 
from the Netherlands.  
The possibility that different supernatural beliefs represent a unitary construct could 
account for the differences in group sizes. Convincing evidence for the multidimensionality of 
supernatural beliefs does not exist (Irwin, 2009), and accordingly, it has been found that 
people who believe in one supernatural phenomena tend to also believe in others (Orenstein, 
2002; Wilson et al., 2014, but see Rice, 2003). This could explain why specifically three 
unbeliever groups were identified, and why there was a hierarchy regarding the amount of 
supernatural beliefs, with analytic atheists being the lowest, followed by uncertain 
nonbelievers, and lastly by SBNR. In other words, the intertwining of different supernatural 
beliefs may explain the large number of analytical atheists who had no supernatural beliefs 
and the small number of SBNR people, who strongly rejected God but held several other 
supernatural beliefs. Because we focused on a sample that explicitly rejected belief in God, it 
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is only natural that most respondents reported a lack of belief in other supernatural 
phenomena and that those with inconsistent beliefs were in a minority. SBNR people were 
also most uncertain about the correctness of their religious attitudes, perhaps reflecting the 
difficulty of entertaining unbelief while at the same time believing in other supernatural 
phenomena. Considering these observations, and the several ways SBNR can be defined, 
future studies should explore the key characteristics of spiritual but not religious individuals 
and examine if the emphasis in the literature on this group has been exaggerated. 
Many previously discussed unbeliever types could not be identified. One of the most 
cited categorizations of religious disbelievers, based partly on theory and partly on empirical 
studies, makes a distinction between analytic atheism, incredulous atheism, apatheism, and 
mind-blind atheism (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013). Of them only analytical atheists were 
identified in this study. Incredulous atheism and apatheism refer to indifference towards 
religious agents and practices. These types of unbelievers are assumed to be prevalent in 
cultures that are characterized by existential security (apatheism) or where there is a relative 
absence of exposure to credible displays of faith in God (incredulous atheism).  Although the 
unbelievers in this study came from such cultures, and they did not differ in parents’ 
religiosity, they were not indifferent but averagely interested in religious issues. Moreover, 
mind-blind atheists were not identified, replicating earlier studies (Maij et al., 2017; Reddish 
et al., 2016; Schaap-Jonker et al., 2013). Although analytic atheists scored higher than 
uncertain nonbelievers and SBNR on the scale of social-cognitive impairment, overall, they 
scored low and the effect size was weak.  
The way we categorized participants into groups may have simplified information about 
dispositions that all participants have to some degree. However, as evinced in this study, 
categorization can reveal important but unpredictable qualitative differences and similarities 
between participant groups: Participants who responded similarly or almost similarly to the 
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statement ‘I believe in God’, differed sometimes considerably in their characteristics and 
attitudes towards religion. Likewise, participants who responded differently, or even in 
opposing ways, had sometimes surprisingly similar attitudes or characteristics. It is hence 
important to remember that religious (un)beliefs, and the relationships between these beliefs 
and their determinants and outcomes, do not necessarily increase or decrease linearly.  
The study also shows that attitude research can be useful for expanding future research 
on religious beliefs and unbeliefs. Drawing on attitudes research, and making a distinction 
between attitudes and their correlates, enabled us to clarify and simplify the diverse attributes 
and terms that have been used to describe various forms of religious unbelief.  Attitude 
theories include several widely validated hypotheses about issues that could be studied in 
future, for example the ways attitudes toward religion are formed and how they predict 
behavior and intergroup relations.  
Finally, religious unbelief indicated here either an overall lack of supernatural beliefs, 
or an endorsement of nonreligious supernatural beliefs, possibly substituting organized 
religions.  Believing in supernatural has its own distinct etiology, reflected also in the findings 
that the three unbeliever groups differed most in intuitive thinking style, over-mentalizing 
bias and other ontological confusions. This twofold manifestation of religious unbelief should 
be acknowledged in future theory and research in the field.  
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Figure 1. Variables by which the observed unbeliever groups are characterized in this study 
(in italics). The superordinate variables (capitalized) describe sources and consequences of 
most attitude objects with one exception: while beliefs are central components of attitudes, 
they are here differentiated from attitudes because the study does not focus on attitudes 
towards the belief objects (e.g., God).  
 
Figure 2. Supernatural Beliefs Among the Three Latent Group Members (Analytic Atheists, 
Uncertain Nonbelievers, and Spiritual but Not Religious) and Among Participants Who 
Reported Believing in God.  
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